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Abstract
Developing countries that host mega-events such as the Olympic Games and World Cup
invest enormous sums in stadiums and collateral infrastructure projects. The paper examines the
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1.1 Introduction
Economic impact estimates from mega-sports events by some accounts have been, well,
mega. The University of São Paulo and Ernst & Young estimated that the economic impact from
the World Cup in June/July 2014 and the Summer Olympic Games in 2016 in Brazil together
could total $100 billion dollars and create 120,000 new jobs (Sustainable Brazil: Social and
Economic Impacts of the 2014 World Cup 2011). Rather than joyous throngs filling Brazilian
streets bestowing sainthood on the government savants who orchestrated the country’s sport
induced, economic windfall, in June of 2013 a reported million people mobbed the streets of
Brazilian cities protesting the country’s priorities as symbolized by hosting these hallmark events
(Lundy 2013). How does one reconcile these extreme opposite positions? Why would citizens
of the world’s seventh largest economy vehemently and sometimes violently protest an increase
in their GDP of 4.5 percent (World Bank 2014), and a reduction in the number of people
unemployed by 10.62 percent (Trading Economics 2014).1
The wisdom of hosting sports mega-events has increasingly been questioned particularly
for emerging economies. Independent scholars analyzing the economics of hallmark events
almost unanimously share the angst of the Brazilian protestors primarily for two reasons. First,
mega-sports events fail to deliver the economic bonanza promised by event organizers, boosters,
and those who award the events. Second, the benefits and costs are disproportionately shared.
A mystery of sorts emerges in light of scholarly findings and recent practice. A reporter
brought the puzzle into sharper profile recently when she asked the simple question: “If your
analysis is right regarding the lack of any meaningful economic impact from mega events, then
why do cities and nations continue to compete so vigorously to host them?” Such practical
questions do put scholars on their heels. The possibility exists that the majority of independent
scholarship has missed the mark, and that it is prudent for developing countries to pursue
hosting. The purpose of this article is to examine what motivates emerging economies to host,
and to analyze whether those motives and outcomes associated with them do justify hosting.
The arguments for hosting relate primarily to the economics of doing so. The
fundamental question is: do the costs and benefits justify developing countries hosting mega
sports events? If it can be demonstrated that the cost-benefit and risk-reward profiles for hosting
as they currently exist do not justify doing so, then it is important to address the issue of what
can be changed to improve the economic outcomes for the developing economies that have, with
1

increasing frequency, so aggressively pursued them. Those who benefit, furthermore, often do
not bear costs in proportion to the benefits derived. Independent scholarship began to surface in
response to the obvious public finance issues involved, and the use of authoritative, “scientific”
studies by boosters proposing that the benefits to the public in the final analysis far exceeded the
costs, thereby justifying financial and moral support for hosting.
Emerging nations historically have hosted the FIFA World Cup more frequently than the
Summer and/or Winter Olympic Games. Table 1 shows that during the period 1930 through
1966, developed and emerging countries have hosted the World Cup on 5 and 3 occasions,
respectively. Historically, FIFA alternated the World Cup between the powerhouse soccerplaying countries in Latin America and Europe. If Russia and other BRICs nations (BRIC is an
acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are categorized as emerging economies, then from
1970 through 2022, World Cup hosting has been divided equally between developed and
emerging nations. Once again if Russia is classified as an emerging economy, the last four
World Cups have been awarded to developing countries. The trend appears to be toward
emerging economies hosting the World Cup more frequently. This is explained, in part, by
FIFA’s more recent desire to expand the game into regions that have not typically embraced the
sport in the same way that the traditional hotbed of the sport in Europe and Latin America have.

2

Table 1.1
Host Cities for the World Cup since 1930
World Cup/Year
1930

Host Country
Uruguay

Developed (D) or Emerging (E)
E

1934

Italy

D

1938

France

D

1950

Brazil

E

1954

Switzerland

D

1958

Sweden

D

1962

Chile

E

1966

England

D

1970

Mexico

E

1974

West Germany

D

1978

Argentina

E

1982

Spain

D

1986

Mexico

E

1990

Italy

D

1994

USA

D

1998

France

D

2002

South Korea

D

2006

Germany

D

2010

South Africa

E

2014

Brazil

E

2018

Russia

E

2022
Qatar
E
Source: “FIFA World Cup & Olympic Games Host Nations.” 2015. WorldFactsInc. Accessed
May 28. https://sites.google.com/site/worldfactsinc/FIFA-World-Cup--Olympic-Games-HostNations.
The Summer Olympic Games show a similar trend in that the frequency of hosting by
emerging nations has increased over time. Specifically, the Summer Olympic Games were
hosted exclusively by developed countries from 1928 through 1964. For the period 1968
through the present, developed and emerging nations have hosted 12 and 4 times, respectively.
3

The Winter Olympic Games has exhibited a similar increasing incidence of hosting by
developing countries, but to a lesser degree. Developed countries were exclusive hosts for the
Winter Olympic Games from 1928 through 1964. The period 1968 through the present has
shown a 12 to 2 developed-to-emerging nation split if Russia (Sochi, Russia, 2014) and the
former Yugoslavia (Sarajevo, Yugoslavia in 1984) are categorized as emerging economies.
Even simply bidding for the Olympics has become far more commonplace for developing
nations. Between 1896 and 1996, 82 percent of all Summer Olympics bids came from
industrialized countries while 10 percent came from developing countries and another 10 percent
came from Eastern Bloc or former Soviet states. Between 2000 and 2016, less than half of all
bids came from industrialize nations. On the Winter Olympics side, 93 percent of bids between
1924 and 1998 came from the industrialize world, while only 56 percent of bidding cities from
2002 through 2014 came from the same regions.

1.2 Drivers for Emerging Economy Hosting
Global developments beyond the world of commercial sport do explain to a significant
extent the motivations for hosting hallmark events among both developed and emerging nations.
The narrative in this portion of the article identifies the drivers in general and then discusses
them more specifically. Painting with the broadest possible strokes, potential host nations/cities
envision that hosting can be used to promote national unity and provide a clearer representation
of the nation’s personality and/or culture (Varrel and Kennedy 2011). Second, nations and cities
seek to host in the expectation that it will significantly boost their economies. This particular
motivation has assumed greater urgency given structural developments in the global economy.
Some of the more important changes are identified and discussed in the remainder of this section
of the article.
First, the global economy has become more open. Economic competition has intensified
across the world in the post-World War II era accelerating in the 1970s. The adoption of a
system of floating exchange rates following the United States unilateral abrogation of the gold
convertibility feature of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System in 1971 arguably
contributed to an expansion of trade in goods, services, and assets globally. The increased
international competition, in turn, arguably has contributed to economic instability, the global
financial crisis of 2008 being one example. The collapse of oil’s price as well as other
4

commodity prices and currency instability particularly in emerging economies in the late summer
of 2015 represents another. The need to provide jobs, particularly for urban residents, always
important, has become even more so in a world of growing economic instability. Social order
and political sustainability would appear to have taken on greater urgency in light of terrorist
movements that depend on an inability of governments to provide economic opportunity and
distributive social justice for their citizens.
Second, urban populations have been growing at a stunning rate. 62.1 percent of the
world’s population lived in rural areas in 1975; that percentage fell to 53 percent by 2000
(“Urban Areas: Global Overview” 2002). It is estimated that 66 percent of the world’s
population will live in urban areas by 2050 (United Nations 2014). Most of this growth in urban
populations has occurred in the developing world with 5 million additional residents being
absorbed by cities each month in emerging nations which accounts for 95 percent of global urban
growth (“Urban Areas: Global Overview” 2002). The migration to mega cities has stressed
those economies and social institutions, and governments have failed to keep pace in providing
for many essentials. The provision of basic needs such as jobs, transportation, security,
education, potable water, sewage treatment, and refuse disposal has languished. State,
provincial, and federal governments have not been able to make up for the shortfall in funds to
finance metropolitan infrastructure. Federal and state governments, in fact, in some countries
have cut back on revenue sharing when cities have needed the funds most. This has occurred
because governments at all levels have been experiencing financial stress.
The financial scissors crisis, cutting on both the revenue and cost side, for nations and
cities has compelled a more entrepreneurial strategy by them in dealing with their financial
woes.2 Mega-events have the capacity to unify diverse, and often adversarial political coalitions,
and to accelerate the pace at which projects are conceived and completed. That coupled with the
hope of a financial windfall from a mega-event, buoyed by event booster studies, has proved too
alluring to resist for many countries and cities in the developed and developing world. The
emphasis on hosting sports teams, attracting political conventions, constructing museums,
aquariums, and concert venues have reflected the broader metropolitan, entrepreneurial strategy
for reinvigorating or sustaining urban economics especially in the developed world. Emerging
economy municipal governments have not been able to provide consumer goods at the same
level, but it appears that they have sought to imitate the success of the 1984 Los Angeles
5

Summer Olympic Games, which turned a profit of approximately $225 million (in 1984 dollars).
(Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee 1984)
Mega-event hosting has generally been viewed as one way of helping a city bolster its
tourist trade. Tourism has the further advantage of being viewed as a clean industry that could
give an urban economy a significant boost. The alleged transformation of Barcelona into a
tourist destination following that City’s hosting of the 1992 Summer Olympic Games lent
currency to that proposition.
Third, with regard to tourism, that industry has grown at a rapid rate. Tourist arrivals
numbered less than 20 million in 1950, reached 922 million by 2008, and are expected to reach
1.6 billion by 2020 (“The Global Growth of Tourism” 2014). Europe and the United States have
been the most frequent travel destinations, but the extraordinary growth in tourism has occurred
throughout the world to include Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The trend is likely to
continue as a result of advances in travel technology; holiday entitlement; increases in disposable
income; availability and type of travel; and media coverage (“The Global Growth of Tourism”
2014). Tourism has been identified and emphasized by most countries as essential to increasing
economic growth and creating jobs. The threat of terrorism, in the Middle East in particular, has
provided powerful testimony to the importance of tourism as terrorists have targeted the tourist
industry in their attempts to undermine the economies of countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.
Trends in the tourist industry imply that there are more potential visitors for any country, but at
the same time there are more options available to tourists and a disinclination to visit countries
that pose the most significant safety risks. A sports mega-event can provide an entrée into the
potentially lucrative tourist trade.
Fourth, mega-sports events have evolved into significant, if not the most important and
recognizable, global brands and have been aggressively promoted to an international audience by
those who “own” and “rent” them. A country is willing to pay handsomely for the opportunity to
market themselves through occupying center stage on the planet for a fortnight or longer.
The marketing of mega events has accelerated as a consequence of two historically
distinct but intimately related developments: the first sale of television rights for the Olympic
Games in 1956 in Melbourne, Australia,3 and corporate sponsorships which fully emerged as a
key part of the model for financing mega-events for and following the 1984 Summer Olympic
Games in Los Angeles. Juan Antonio Samaranch, the late head of the IOC, identified the
6

importance of television in 2001. Samaranch stated: “We need spectators at the Games, but the
IOC does not insist on 100,000 seat stadiums. The Olympics are primarily put on for television”
(Barney 2004). The size of television audiences in particular has proved enormously seductive
for developed and developing countries alike in vying for the right to host.
Corporate sponsors’ raison d’être for their involvement in the financing of mega-sports
events is to sell products. Advertising is critical to that effort. The broadcasts of the Olympic
Games and the World Cup reach the largest potential market for any program on a consistent
basis. The 2012 London Olympic Games set a TV record for viewers in the U.S. with 219.4
million tuned in for the event, breaking the 2008 Beijing Games record of 215 million U.S.
viewers alone (London Olympics 2012 Ratings: Most Watched Event in TV History” 2012).
The global audience for the Summer Olympic Games is approximately 3.2 billion people. No
other event has as great an overall audience, but the finals of the FIFA World Cup typically have
the greatest number of viewers for a single event – the World Cup Final. The championship
match in 2010 between Spain and the Netherlands had an audience of 909 million people.
The media over the past several decades has developed a symbiotic relationship with
mega-sports events. The integration of sports and the media within countries has been a
development common to the commercial sports industry in most nations. Sports sell
newspapers, beer, trucks, remedies for sexual dysfunction, and television sets. That growing
intimacy between commercial sports and the media, a century in the making, arguably has to
some extent muted media coverage of protests and other means through which hosting is
criticized. If the media can benefit economically from hosting a mega event, should it surprise
anyone that the media is less willing and able to report objectively about the economic efficacy
of doing so? There are those instances, however, where civil unrest as a consequence of hosting
is newsworthy enough to warrant media coverage, witness Brazilian unrest regarding their
hosting the World Cup in 2014 and the upcoming Summer Olympic Games in 2016, but by and
large public criticism of hosting has either been underreported if not all together ignored by the
media.
The corporate model and its emphasis on broadcast have been responsible for rewriting
the Olympic Charter in several important ways as well. One of the more noteworthy was the
1986 revision of the Charter that allowed professional athletes to participate. This action, in
part, was motivated by the desire to reinvigorate the U.S. broadcast market, which had been
7

flagging. Passing the torch from government to corporation sponsors as the primary means for
funding mega events has irrevocably changed them. Emerging economies could potentially
benefit in numerous ways through their leaders rubbing elbows with sports celebrities as well as
forging a more intimate relationship with corporate sponsors, which could generate greater
foreign investment among other economic benefits.
Television has made event location less meaningful than in the time when live spectators
drove revenues. The goal for the modern Games and their corporate sponsors is to reach as
many viewers as possible. Mega event sites are no longer confined to the developed, western
world. BRICs nations constitute the vanguard of emerging economies, and with their huge
markets (BRICs had a population of 2.78 billion and accounted for 15% of global GDP in 2009),
they are increasingly demanding equal access to center stage globally, social power, and
economic opportunity. BRICs understands the symbolic importance of hosting mega-sports
events, and BRICs have or will host the last three World Cups that have been awarded, two of
the three Summer Olympic Games between 2008 and 2016, and the 2014 Winter Olympic
Games. The IOC and FIFA interests and those of BRICs nations have neatly dovetailed. BRICs
nations use hallmark sports events to achieve non-sports goals such as nation branding and social
development; the IOC and FIFA want to bring their brands to the most populous countries in the
world.
A final reason for hosting may well have something to do with the probability of a host
country performing well on the global stage during the event. If hosting has proved too
tantalizing for counties to resist for broadly defined marketing reasons, a virtuoso performance
during the World Cup or the Olympic Games compounds the commercial promise. Twenty
World Cups have been held since 1930 and the host country has won five times and placed
second twice. A success rate of 25 to 35 percent makes hosting far more enticing.
It is fair to say that hosting a mega-sports event is driven to a significant degree by the
promise of an economic windfall. While some groups in a society clearly will benefit more than
others, a disproportionate sharing of benefits can be made more tolerable if it can be
demonstrated that a city or country can be made better off overall through hosting even if some
constituencies are harmed by the event. And, of course, there is always the possibility, however
remote, that an expansion of an economy can make everyone better off, i.e. “a rising tide raises
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all boats.” The next section in the paper will review the literature with regard to the net benefits
of hosting as promulgated by those who lead the charge to host.

1.3 Review of the Literature Regarding Hosting
Economists assume that economic actors are rational. Rationality implies that an action
will be undertaken only if it the economic benefits exceed the economic costs. Hosting a megasports event is rational if the benefits from so doing exceed the costs incurred where costs
include both explicit and opportunity (implicit) costs. The litmus test for using public funds for
hosting is not simply a positive accounting return from the event, but a positive economic return.
Stated somewhat differently, the event must demonstrably provide the highest return from all the
possible uses of public funds. Controversy about hosting has intensified arguably because of the
seeming growing scarcity of public funds, and the need to ensure that those funds are put to the
best possible use. A second fundamental public finance issue that looms large in the debate over
using public funds to host hallmark events has to do with whether those who benefit from
hosting assume costs in proportion to the benefits derived. Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the
Twenty-First Century has brought into sharper focus the growing skewness in the distribution of
wealth and income throughout the world. This growing inequality has heightened skepticism
regarding projects that require significant public funding without substantial demonstrable
benefits for the taxpaying public.
The literature on the subject of the efficacy of hosting mega-sports events historically has
focused more on the issue of the rationality of hosting. That emphasis may have shifted
somewhat since emerging economies have exhibited a greater desire to host. It would appear to
be the case that the prudent use of public funds is more imperative in emerging economies than
in industrialized nations, since basic needs are less frequently met in the developing world. It is
safe to say, however, that if there were no economic return from hosting, an inequitable
distribution of benefits and costs would seem a virtual certainty. It is fair to say, furthermore,
that much of the evolving debate about an economic return greater than zero has produced some
creative and suspect representations of benefits while neglecting or underrepresenting important
costs. All of these issues constitute the gist of scholarly criticism regarding the prudence of
hosting.
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Rather than reciting all the major scholarly research that has failed to find positive
economic returns from hosting, it can simply be stated that scholars seem to be close to
unanimous in their view that the benefits from hosting generally do not appear substantial
enough (or that the costs are too great) to ensure an economic return. That view is based, to
some extent at least, on the notion that whatever infrastructure that is constructed, other than
sports facilities, is constructed to accommodate a hallmark event could otherwise have been
created without the huge and wasteful spending that constitutes the sports infrastructure
specifically needed for the event. It would take benefits unique to a mega-event to argue for
hosting on economic grounds.
A review of the literature has identified an article authored by economists that makes
such a claim, albeit with some noteworthy caveats. Two authors proposed an outcome from
hosting that, if true, would make hosting, or seeking to host, a seemingly rational act (Rose and
Spiegel 2011). Rose and Spiegel found that hosting correlated with a 30 percent permanent
increase in exports. If the Olympics or World Cup caused an increase in exports of that
magnitude, it could be argued that any country with even a modestly sized export sector would
be foolish not to host. Two important caveats have to be noted and were identified by Rose and
Spiegel. First, hosting does not cause the increase in exports to any appreciable degree; the
Olympics and World Cup rather signal the growing economic openness of the host nation.
Second, “competing to host” is a signal sufficiently strong to induce the same outcome as it
relates to an expansion of the country’s export sector. Would-be hosts, or applicant cities,
experience the same or similar economic results without all the expenses and risks involved in
hosting. That would appear to indicate that it is not hosting that matters, but a willingness to
pursue a more liberal trade agenda that accounts for an increase in exports and an expansion of
an economy. Indeed, further research on the topic by Maennig and Richter (2012) finds that
when one compares bidding nations to otherwise similar non-bidding countries through an
appropriate matching methodology, the supposed “Olympic Effect” disappears.
Other possible motivations for hosting revealed include instilling a sense of national pride
or encouraging a nation to “feel good” about itself. A feel-good effect correlates with reduced
crime rates and increased levels of physical activity that, in turn, lead to improved national health
according to some analysts. Health and happiness are difficult to measure, and there is the
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danger that values for qualitative impacts could be “measured” to ensure that hosting qualifies as
a rational act.
It is noteworthy, once again, that the BRICs nations represent those emerging economies
most inclined to host. There does appear to be agreement within this group of nations regarding
a strategy for assuming a stronger voice in global affairs. Hosting a mega-event appears to be an
important component of that strategy as noted on the previous page of this article. The globe
appears to be increasingly organized along regional lines, and it may well be that hosting a sports
mega-event articulates a supra-national or regional identity. It would be inaccurate, however, to
think of BRICs as a single entity. Each of the four countries faces problems unique to them, and
confronting their individual problems very likely trumps the pursuit of shared interests. Shared
regional interests, however, do serve as a unifying force and have provided greater leverage in
confronting the rest of the world. South Africa’s 2010 World Cup was often referred to as the
African World Cup when African leaders gathered prior to the event to promote and plan it.

1.4 Economic Expectations and Outcomes from Hosting for Emerging Economies
This section of the article focuses on a comparison of economic outcomes expected from
hosting to actual outcomes. The specific emerging-economy experiences analyzed are for the
World Cup hosted by South Africa in 2010; the Commonwealth Games hosted by India in 2010;
and the World Cup hosted by Brazil in 2014. South Africa is included in a group of countries
referred to as the “next 11”, the eleven nations that are thought to be the most important
emerging economies following the four BRICs countries. This three-country sample provides a
good representation, therefore, of how hosting expectations compares to actual outcomes for
emerging economies.
The most important driver for hosting arguably is the expected economic windfall which
can be defined for either the short-term or long-term. The idea of nation branding has clear longterm commercial implications. Branding, the perception of what a country is and can do,
involves the creation of a foundation for expanded commercial, political, and social interaction.
A country that proves to be adept at organizing and performing all the tasks necessary to
successfully host a sports mega-event, with its multitude of challenges, is more likely to be
viewed as a trustworthy, competent partner in interactions going forward. Embellishing a
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nation’s brand is clearly an important goal for a host city and/or nation; it is thought to be a
means through which a significant economic legacy can be created.
Legacy benefits are difficult to assess. The short-term benefits from hosting, increased
economic activity beginning with the construction phase in preparation for an event through the
event itself, provides immediate feedback on the economic success of the event. If an economic
windfall is to occur it should happen during the time building up to the event with a significant
spike at economic ground zero, the time of the event. The focus in this portion of the article will
be on employment, government finances, tourism, and the development of infrastructure vital to
providing for an economic legacy. What do the experiences of South Africa, India, and Brazil
provide in the way of feedback about the economic performance of sports mega-events? Table
1.4.1 provides statistics regarding key performance variables for the three sports mega-events
hosted by South Africa, India, and Brazil for that which was expected and that which actually
occurred.
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Table 1.4.1:

Expected and Actual Outcomes for Selected Variables for
Mega-Event Hosting by South Africa, India, and Brazil

Statistic/Country

South Africa: World
Cup 2010 Estimated
Value (Actual Value)

India (Delhi):
Commonwealth
Games (CWG) 2010
Estimated Value
(Actual Value)
$265 million from Bid
Book (Approximately
$4.1 billion)b`

Hosting Costs

$343 Million from
Bid Book ($7.088
Billion)

Tourists Attending
the Event
Tourist Overnignt
Stays
Average Tourist
Expenditure
National Financial
Accounting Profit
(Loss)

483,000 (between
220,000 to 310,000)
14 to 18 days (10.3
days)
$3,986 ($1,550)

182,000 (75,606)

(-$6.579 billion)

$145 million (-3.7
billion). It was
projected that CWG
would add 4.94 billion
to India’s GDP.c

Awarding Entity
Profit
Stadium
Expenditure
Amount in $

FIFA $567 million
$1.544 billion

$1.02 billion

Stadium
Expenditure: % of
Total Expenditures
Transportation
Expenditure
Transportation
Expenditure as a %
of Overall
Expenditures
Job Creation

37%

25%

$1.716 billion

$1.983 billion

39%

48%

Brazil: World Cup
2014 Estimated
Value(Actual Value)

(Approximately $13
billion; some
estimates as high as
$15 billion)e
Approximately
600,000 (1 million)

FIFA $2.6 billion
Bid Book cost = $1.1
billion ($3.6 billion
approximately 90% of
which was public $)e
27.7% ($3.6
billion/$13 billion)

Projected that CWG
3.63 million per one
would create 2.47
year equivalent
million “employment
(25,383 net hires in
opportunities”d
June 2014)e
Source: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 2015. Sustainable Mega-Events in Developing Countries.
Accessed August 5. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29583-1522-1-30.pdf?120124104515.
695,000 in 2009;
280,000 in 2010; and
174,000 in 2011a
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a

Identifying the number of jobs actually created is not possible because of the global recession
that is popularly thought to have begun in the third quarter of 2008 with the implosion of global
financial markets. South Africa appears to have lost approximately one million jobs due to the
recession.
b
Derived by taking the City of Delhi infrastructure expenditures other than those for sports
facilities ($1.983 billion) and dividing that by the fraction of total expenditures to produce the
Commonwealth Games (CG) represented by City of Delhi infrastructure expenditures (.48).
$1.983 billion/.48 = 4.13 billion.
c
The projected surplus was determined by subtracting the “Bid-Book” cost of $265 million from
the projected revenue of $410 million. The actual loss of $3.7 billion was determined by
subtracting the actual cost of hosting of $4.1 billion from the actual net revenue of $40 million
(revenue from CWG of $101.5 million minus the cost of generating that revenue of $61.5 million
= $40 million in net revenue). The official position appeared to be that CWG would be “revenue
neutral” or that it would generate a small surplus.
d
Once again the onset of the recession of 2008 makes it virtually impossible to determine the
number of jobs actually created. There was no post-CWG audit to determine the number of jobs
created; all the evidence points to the fact that job opportunities were far below what had been
projected.
e
FIFA. 2007. Brazil Bid: Inspection Report for the 2014 World Cup, October 30.
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/mission/62/24/78/inspectionreport_e_24841.pdf
; Morpurgo, Guilia. 2015. “Brazil and the World Cup’s Economic Impact – A Look Back.”
Perspectives: Student-Led Economics Journal, February 19. http://kcleconomics.com/a-lookback-to-2014brazil-and-the-world-cups-economic-impact/ ; Associated Press. 2015. “FIFA
Returns $100M to Brazil; World Cup cost $15 billion.” USA Today, January 20.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2015/01/20/fifa-returns-100m-to-brazil-world-cupcost-15-billion/22050583/.
f
Mitra, Arjyo. 2014. “An Ethical Analysis of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil.” Seven Pillars
Institute, September 8. http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/ethical-analysis-of-tje-2014fifa-world-cup-brazil.
The statistics in Table 1.4.1 indicate several noteworthy things. First, the actual costs of
hosting are a significant multiple of the budget for hosting represented in the “Bid Book”. The
World Cup hosted by South Africa and the Commonwealth Games hosted by Delhi in 2010
resulted in actual costs that eclipsed the Bid-Book budget by 2,067 and 1,547 percent,
respectively. There was no Bid Book budget number identified for the World Cup in Brazil in
2014. Rather than specific numbers, the Bid Book provided the following information with
regard to the cost of hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup:
The bid LOC representatives were able to demonstrate that they had applied
a sound methodology in preparing the preliminary budget that systematically
addressed all of the requirements of the Hosting Agreement regarding the
hosting and staging of the final competition of the 2014 FIFA World Cup™.
14

The assumptions made in the preparation of the preliminary budget were well
explained and documented and the level of supporting detail is sufficient to
permit a detailed examination of the preliminary budget for the 2014 FIFA
World Cup™ for all cost categories (FIFA 2007).

The fact that the actual cost of hosting exceeded the Bid-Book cost by such a significant
sum for the World Cup and South Africa and the Confederation Games in Delhi may be
attributable to a perceived need to low-ball the cost estimates in bidding for an event and/or
enormous cost over-runs once the event is secured. Cost over-runs may be the result of cost
escalation clauses in construction contracts, legal challenges, unforeseen construction issues to
include meeting environmental concerns, construction firms exercising monopoly power where it
exists, and corruption.
Second, infrastructure costs relating to the construction of stadiums/arenas and training
facilities for developing countries account for twenty-five percent or more of all costs of hosting.
That percentage for emerging economies is likely to be considerably higher than it is for
developed country hosts who already possess considerable stadium/arena infrastructure. Los
Angeles incurred relatively little in the way of infrastructure costs in hosting the 1984 Summer
Olympic Games for example. Approximately 73 percent of the costs incurred for the Los
Angeles Games were in fact administrative costs. Similarly, the United States spent just $5.3
million on stadium construction and refurbishment for the 1994 World Cup. This is a far
different cost profile than what it is that we see for emerging-country hosts (Zarnowski 2015).
Stadium expenditures for the 2010 and 2014 World Cups in South Africa and Brazil totaled $2.1
and $3.6 billion, respectively. A misallocation of capital resources for stadiums will have longterm implications for growth and development.
Third, the number of additional visitors to South Africa and Delhi as a consequence of
their events fell short of expectations. The number of additional tourists to visit South Africa in
the June-July period was estimated to be 200,000, which was significantly below that which was
expected especially when compared to early claims following the announcement that South
Africa had been selected to host the 2010 World Cup (South Africa’s World Cup Warning to
Brazil, June 9, 2014). Early indications are that incremental tourism in Brazil as a consequence
of the World Cup exceeded expectations. That was the only case in which an outcome surprised
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in a positive way for all the data represented in Table 1.4.1. The evidence, however, with regard
to the unexpected surprise as it relates to tourism in Brazil was not consistently found. The
Brazilian Airline Association reported a reduction in air traffic of 11-15 percent in June 2014
when compared to June 2013 (Alves 2014). The reason for the decline in air travel apparently
had to do with a significant reduction in the number of business people traveling within Brazil
during the World Cup.
Job creation statistics are difficult to discern in the emerging country sample reviewed.
The 2010 events job creation outcomes were clearly obscured by the 2008 global economic
collapse due to the implosion of world financial markets. Based on the evidence that does exist
it appears that job creation that could be reasonably expected from an event based on the
evidence from Brazil fell far below that which actually occurred. New hires in Brazil in June
2014 at the peak of World Cup activity amounted to only 25,383. Prorating the expected job
creation outcome of 3.63 million implies that actual job creation was less than one-tenth of that
which was expected from the World Cup (3.63/12 = 302,500/25,583 = 11.82).
The important overall conclusion is that mega-sports events have not produced the
economic outcomes that have motivated the emerging country aggressive pursuit of them. The
next portion of the paper will examine why actual outcomes have fallen short of that which is
expected.

1.5 Reasons for Outcomes falling Short of Expectations
This portion of the paper will identify and discuss why economic outcomes for sports
mega-events have fallen short of expectations. The primary reasons are: (1) unreasonable
expectations; (2) white elephant stadiums; (3) monopoly rents appropriated by event owners; (4)
poor event management; and (5) corruption. Each of these reasons will be discussed in the text
that follows.

1.5.1 Unreasonable Expectations
The information recorded in Table 1.4.1 indicated that for the three-country sample of
emerging economies hosting sports mega-events, the benefits are significantly exaggerated and
the costs significantly underplayed. That reality for this sample of countries holds true for
virtually all the countries, developing and emerging alike, that have hosted hallmark events
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(Matheson, 2013). The reason for this economics chicanery very likely has to do with securing
approval for using public funds to host in democracies. There is less a need to do so in countries
that are not democratic in practice. It should come as little surprise that among the original seven
bidders for the 2022 Winter Olympics, all of the democratic nations dropped out of the race
citing cost concerns, leaving only Almaty, Kazakhstan and Beijing, China, countries with little
democratic tradition, as the only remaining potential hosts. Even in countries when the citizenry
has little political voice, however, it is politically prudent to offer at least the pretense that megaevents can be catalysts for economic growth. Boosters would like the populace to believe that
expenditures on mega-events should be viewed as investments and not as wasteful and
ostentatious public consumption that benefit a few at the expense of the vast majority. Those
who are asked to pay through the use of their taxes or diminished social services are tacitly asked
to take pride in the very act of hosting and the knowledge that our country was capable to putting
on such a grand spectacle.
Mega-event success can be measured through a comparison of what was promised
relative to what was delivered. Perceived problems with the event are exacerbated (problems
will always arise because mega-events by their very nature are socially disruptive) when
outcomes from the event fail to match expectations. There are two ways to handle this problem:
(1) improve outcomes; and/or (2) provide a more modest representation of that which can be
expected. Management of expectations has apparently been excluded from consideration in
selling mega-events to a public that is apparently getting increasing skeptical about their
efficacy. A chief culprit in the realm of poorly managed expectations is the commissioned
prospective economic impact study for the event. The reality is that a model that enables a good
understanding of what an event will do for a large, diverse urban economy has not yet been
created. Input-output models no matter how sophisticated cannot by their nature account for the
leakages and substantial substitution effects that ensue when an exogenous shock occurs. The
sense that technical competence ensures correct outcomes very likely overwhelms the common
sense of official decision makers, or they want to believe the “authoritative” findings of
commissioned researchers for other reasons. It is arguably a better strategy to use ex post
findings or audits of previous similar mega-events to forecast the likely impact of an event than
to allow expectations to be formed by prospective booster studies. Properly developed and
managed expectations is key to the perception of success of a mega-event.
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Failure to manage expectations has both short- and long-term consequences that may be
serious. The protestations in the streets of Brazilian cities were prompted by the perception that
the staging of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic exemplified misplaced
priorities and catered to the interests of a financially privileged minority. Those perceptions not
only threatened the immediate political construct, but further frayed the social fabric long term
through expanding the divide among social classes. Such costs can be huge and difficult to
undo. Any measure of the return-risk profile for mega-events should account for the increasing
tension among classes that can be induced through hosting a mega-event as opposed to using
those substantial funds to achieve other social objectives.

1.5.2 White Elephant Stadiums
The demands placed on applicant cities or nations for playing facilities to accommodate a
sports mega-event most vividly illustrate the excesses of these social spectacles. The term
“white-elephant” in conjunction with stadiums and arenas has become a cliché in many
languages. It is not just the cost of building the facilities that imposes a financial burden, but
their maintenance can compromise budgets for the long-term. Operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs for stadiums run into the millions of dollars annually once the event ends, and if
the stadiums lie fallow or are underutilized, these costs represent a clear-cut and enduring
burden. Greece and the City of Athens, which hosted the 2004 Summer Olympic Games, have
incurred costs “estimated at $784 million simply to maintain this ghost town of Olympian
extravagance” (Perryman 2012.). Careful and creative thought needs to be devoted to reusing all
components of infrastructure, and the harsh reality in the world of mega-sports events is the lack
of synergy between venues for the games and other sectors of the host economy.
The construction of venues follows event organizer mandates. International
organizations that award mega-sports events, e.g., the IOC and FIFA, require venue construction
to certain specifications that many would consider excessive. These excesses persist because
they have become a feature, a budgetary line-item, in the bidding process and event
implementation and accommodation. The Economist commented:
The Olympic movement, a juggernaut controlled by an unaccountable sporting
elite, is less flexible. The danger signs are in place, with newspapers reporting on
the five-star hotel rooms reserved for foreign Olympic bigwigs and the miles of
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special traffic lanes that will be reserved for Olympic VIPs. Perhaps sporting
success will neutralize public resentment, and the country will feel only pride at
hosting a splendid games, fueling new confidence in Britain's future. But, for
now, the Olympic debate revolves around material costs and benefits rather than
glory. If you want certain cheer, bet on a celebration of Britain's past (Bagehot
2011).

The need to impress the IOC and FIFA to win the increasingly intense competition to
host is an accepted part of the process. As bidding costs mount, bribes, material excess, and a
willingness to pay excessively to host are more likely to occur. Salt Lake City provided a
cautionary tale with regard to the lengths that cities are willing to go to secure an event. The bid
rigging scandal associated with the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter games stained the previously
squeaky clean reputation of area.
Facility construction extravagance is but one aspect of the excesses promoted by the
current arrangements. The IOC Charter does not appear to be overly demanding as it relates to
facilities as the following provision indicates.
…to create, where needed, simple, functional and economical sports facilities in
cooperation with national or international bodies (International Olympic
Committee 2013).

Simple and economical structures are not the norm in stadium construction for mega
events in practice. “Where needed” does not comport with actual construction practice.
Beijing’s Bird Nest cost $478 million, and London’s Wembley Stadium carries a 2014 price tag
of 889 sterling ($1.475 billion in 2014 dollars). The elaborate structures for the opening
ceremonies and some events could be attributable to an extreme example of branding or an
edifice complex on the part of the host city or nation; but the other major culprit appears to be
those entities that award the events. The IOC and FIFA demands clearly contribute to the everescalating stadium costs. The stadiums come at the expense of other social investments such as
education, sanitation, and public transportations. Brazilians understood the nature of the tradeoffs, and ordinary Brazilians were particularly irked by the special accommodations that were
made for FIFA officials in moving them around their traffic-challenged cities. Brazilians
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protesting the recent 9 percent price increase in public transportation could be heard shouting
“give us FIFA transportation”.
FIFA has articulated 11 main points in their stadium manual for construction. FIFA
requires host countries to have at least eight modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000
spectators, and one stadium with a capacity of 80,000 for the opening and final games. Some of
the mandates are spectator and environment friendly; others clearly emphasize the branding and
marketing of the event itself consonant with FIFA’s economic interests presently and in the
future (“Know the FIFA Requirements for World Cup Stadiums” 2009).
The upshot is that modifications based on FIFA and IOC requirements increase costs
substantially. The opening match for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil required modifications on
the Itaquerao Stadium original project from R$335 ($137 million in 2014 dollars) to R$1.07
billion ($436 million in 2014 dollars) to accommodate FIFA's requirements. It has been reported
that the stadium in Manaus in the Amazon which cost $319 million to build may well not be used
again for a highly attended event. Brazilian officials are looking for a public-private partnership
that will support the stadium, but the local soccer clubs hold no such promise in that they draw
no more than a thousand fans for a game. Manaus may well have a stadium shelf life of only
four games, all for the World Cup. Despite maintenance costs estimated at $250,000 per month,
the stadium is currently used for birthday parties and as a bus depot. (Ormiston 2014).
Other examples of excessive and wasteful stadium infrastructure mandated expenditures
abound. South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup followed an all too familiar pattern. The
South African Premier Soccer League, ABSA Premiership, averages 7,500 fans per match, and
has no need for stadiums of the size mandated by FIFA. The five new stadiums constructed for
the World Cup cost approximately $1 billion. Two of the new stadiums built, Peter Mokaba and
Mbombela were built at a cost of $150 and $140 million, respectively. They are utilized on
occasion for soccer and rugby matches. Mbombela Stadium, for example, hosted 12 soccer
matches in 2013 with an average attendance of 7,606, representing on average 16.5 percent of
stadium capacity. Mokaba stadium does not list any full-time or even part-time tenant (Fieno
2014).
The Helliniko Olympic Complex in Athens was supposed to be converted into the largest
metropolitan park in Europe following the 2004 Summer Olympic Games. Today the complex is
for all intents and purposes deserted (Sanburn 2012).
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The Bird’s Nest and Water Cube in Beijing, the iconic structures of the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympic Games, have failed to find regular continued use as sports competition venues
(Lim 2012). The Bird’s Nest has rarely hosted large events since the Olympics and portions of
the stadium have been converted to apartments. The Water Cube was opened for public
swimming in 2009, making it the world’s most expensive lap pool. It subsequently underwent
significant renovations and reopened as a large, indoor water park. While this is a fine long-term
use for an otherwise underutilized facility, it is also an extraordinarily expensive way to build a
water park (Matheson 2013).
The Sydney Olympic Park was declared a white elephant shortly after the 2000 Games
ended. In fact the net cost of the 2000 Summer Games (costs in excess of benefits) has been
estimated to $1.5 billion (“After the Party: What Happens When the Olympics Leave Town”
2008).
Risk appears inescapable for an event host or potential host, but it has not seemingly
discouraged some applicant cities from aggressively pursuing mega events. In fact, in the best
gambling tradition, the question appears to be: do you bet a little or a lot? The British Culture
Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, in reflecting on the Summer Olympic Games in London succinctly
articulated the conundrum:
You can take two attitudes to the Olympics. You can say, these are times of
austerity, and therefore we should pare them down as much as possible. Or you
can say, because these are times of austerity, we need to do everything we
possibly can to harness the opportunity (Clarke 2012).

Emerging economies simply cannot afford to devote a significant portion of their
infrastructure budgets to the construction or renovation of underutilized capital that fails
to have much of a synergistic relationship with other sectors of a growing economy. The
social costs associated with stadium and arena construction and underutilization represent
a long-term problem in that they must be maintained. It is too often the case,
furthermore, that sports stadiums are built in places for which the opportunity cost of the
land is high. Increasingly, those who defend public funding for mega-events stress that
the benefits from hosting occur over the long term. The positive legacy of a hallmark
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event, which arguably has evolved into the most important reason for hosting, could be
muted, if not altogether negated, by the adverse effects on an economy induced by
funding and building sports facilities, which crowd out investment in other forms of
infrastructure that can provide an economic legacy. Those who advocate public funding
of hallmark events often opine that infrastructure investments that do provide an
economic legacy would not occur as rapidly or at all if there was not an event around
which diverse political groups could coalesce. Sports facilities infrastructure,
nonetheless, is a very high price to pay for an acceleration of socially necessary
infrastructure that responsible, effective government in any event should be providing.
None of this is to deny the progress that some host cities have made. Brazil, for
example, has made great strides in reducing poverty and expanding the middle class since
2005. There is no disputing the fact that spending on education, health, and
transportation in Brazil has dwarfed spending on stadiums, but the success of progressive
legislation in Brazil has not been the result of the World Cup (Flannery 2014). South
Africa, India, and Brazil all provided something of an economic legacy through spending
on infrastructure other than sports facilities in accommodating an event. The question is
could these emerging host nations have improved the lives of their citizens appreciably
more the without the egregiously wasteful spending on sports infrastructure that
accompanies mega sports-events?

1.5.3 Monopoly Rents Appropriated by Awarding Organizations
Sports facilities do not represent the only significant misappropriation of funds associated
with sports mega-events. Those who award events, the monopolistic suppliers, have been
criticized extensively for appropriating a disproportionate share of the revenues that the event
generates. The information in Table 1.4.1 indicated that FIFA’s profit from the 2010 World Cup
in South Africa was $567 million; a more recent figure provided by FIFA showed $631 million
in profit on revenue of $3.65 billion (“FIFA Reports $631-M Profit on 2010 World Cup” 2011).
FIFA reported revenue for the 2014 World Cup of $4.8 billion with profit equal to $2.6 billion
(Manfred 2015). FIFA’s records, as it relates to expenditures, indicated that they contributed
“$453 million to the local organizing committee between 2011 and 2014, and, gave Brazil a
$100 million “legacy” payment after the tournament” (Manfred 2015). The profit that FIFA
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made is equal to approximately 72 percent of Brazil’s stadium expenditures to provide some
context.
The risk-reward profile for FIFA is far different for that of the host nation. FIFA and the
IOC require what amounts to a blank check to ensure that all costs from an event are covered to
include the cost over-runs that always accompany any sports mega-event. FIFA and its
subsidiaries to include any third-party organizations hired by or associated with FIFA to assist in
producing the World Cup in Brazil were granted tax-exempt status (Mitra 2014). FIFA assumes
no risk in that its infrastructure is provided, and it appropriates all the revenue from tickets sold
to the event. That is not the typical risk-reward profile for a business. It is certainly not that
which applies to the nation hosting the World Cup, which assumes the risk of significant capital
investment with a disproportionately small share of the immediate rewards.

1.5.4 Poor Management
One of the most important aspects of “nation branding” as it relates to hosting a megaevent is the display of managerial and organizational prowess necessary to produce spectacles of
the size and scope of a World Cup, Commonwealth Games, or Olympic Games. The danger is
that the message could be negative if the host displays incompetence. A host nation occupies
center stage on the globe for a period of time leading up to the event, during the event, and
following the event. The spotlight has become more intense over time with the growing
sophistication and popularity of the Internet and social media. Any foul-up will be magnified,
and the host country’s brand tarnished. Display before play, and woe-be the country that does
not organize and manage the event well.
Prior to the 2010 World Cup the fear that South Africa’s reputation for certain kinds of
crime would further harm South Africa’s reputation and undermine their attempts to advance
tourism through hosting the World Cup. The fact that South Africa hired more than 40,000
additional police to ensure that World Cup spectators would be secure likely was critical for
negating that fear and ensuring an expansion of the tourist industry following the event. It has
been reported, however, that South Africa spent an estimated $13,000 for every additional visitor
for the 2010 World Cup (Egan 2014). That sum will diminish, of course, if the favorable
impression that South Africa made on first-time visitors to the World Cup translates into
additional tourists. That remains to be seen.
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Sochi, Russia, Brazil, and Qatar, most recently, arguably have not always fared well
under the harsh glare of media lights. The extraordinary cost of the Sochi Winter Olympic
Games (more than $50 billion), deficient hotels, and the threats of terrorism appeared daily and
cast Sochi and Russia in an unfavorable light. Brazil’s vocal protestors, stadium disasters, the
slow pace of construction, and the changing of government leadership in managing the many
event-related crises in Brazil may have damaged the Brazilian brand. Brazil’s image had to
suffer when IOC Vice President John Coates stated that Rio’s preparations for the 2016 Summer
Olympics Games are “the worst I have experienced” (Barnes 2014). An expose regarding the
toxic nature of the water in which certain Olympic sports will be held in Rio’s environs has had
an adverse impact on Brazil’s image (“AP Study Finds Viruses Linked to Rio De Janeiro
Olympic Waters” 2015). The well-publicized human rights abuses of guest workers in Qatar
coupled with the unprecedented costs of stadium construction for the 2022 World Cup there may
have done extraordinary harm to the “Qatar brand”. The point is that branding through an event
cuts both ways. The risk is great that hosting can tarnish a country’s image if the event is poorly
managed as well as good organization and management enhancing it.

1.5.5 Corruption
The structure of the mega-sports events market provides ample opportunity for
corruption. First, the awarding entities are the sole providers of a product, the event. Second,
the size of the event necessitates public subsidies, and those who oversee spending are less
attentive to the use of third-party funds. Third, the financial benefits of hosting an event are
concentrated in the hands of a few industries; construction companies, banks, and the hospitality
sector generally benefit. If those sectors are dominated by a few large firms, then the bidding
process may well involve kick-backs, political contributions, and bribery to secure contracts.
These forces allegedly have been manifest in Brazil in conjunction with preparations for the
2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The Economist recently reported:
However, in September a police investigation found that some of this growth was
thanks to padded contracts that at least six of Brazil’s biggest construction firms,
with combined domestic revenues of 19 billion reals ($8.8 billion) in 2013 had for
years been signing with Petrobas, the state-controlled oil giant in exchange for
kickbacks to politicians. Around 30 construction executives are now awaiting
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trial or charges of corruption or money laundering including the boss of UTC
Engenhana Brazil’s seventh-biggest builder (“Brazilian Construction Firms:
Knock ‘Em Down, Build ‘Em Up: Government Cuts and a Bribery Scandal Will
Prompt a Shake-Out in the Industry” 2015).

Corruption has recently been alleged involving FIFA officials. Fourteen people including
nine FIFA and five corporate executives were indicted on May 27, 2015, and face racketeering,
conspiracy, and corruption charges in the United States. The 47-count indictment alleges that
those indicted engaged in illegal activities to enrich themselves over 24 years. The length of
time over which illegal activity has been alleged suggests that corruption is systemic in the sports
mega-event industry and includes developed as well as emerging nations.

1.6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the motivations for emerging nations to bid for
sports mega-events. The paper first identified what the drivers were and why. The paper also
analyzed those motivations in an attempt to assess whether the drivers made sense in light of the
outcomes versus the expectations regarding the benefits from hosting. The outcomes versus
expectations suggest that it does not make sense for emerging nations to host hallmark sports
spectacles if quantifiable benefits are compared to costs. What the outcomes do suggest is that
emerging-nation hosting is most likely a signal that a developing country communicates to the
rest of the world that it perceives itself as ascending, and possesses economic might that merits a
larger voice in global affairs. Soft diplomacy appears to be a particular strategy of the BRICs
nations as most of the sports mega-events that have been hosted by emerging nations are
members of that group or what is referred to as the “next 11”. The intensity of the message
would appear to vary across the emerging nations reflecting both their real and perceived
economic and political strength.
It is clear that hosting has become an increasingly expensive gambit, and one with the
potential to harm the economy of an emerging nation. There are clearly some things that need to
be done to ensure that countries are not victimized through hosting. The most obvious thing is
the mitigation of the power of the monopoly producers, FIFA and IOC in particular; they have to
be regulated at the very least. Expensive stadiums, corruption, and the inequitable arrangement
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with regard to revenue sharing is a direct consequence of the exercise of monopoly power.
Applicant cities and nations need to recognize their shared interests and join together to ensure
that the sports mega-events that the world appears to want are provided adhering to sound
economic principles and practice. Most countries simply cannot afford the high risk and low
returns that characterize hallmark events currently.
It is also important to use what is available in the way of information regarding economic
outcomes and expectations to provide a realistic perception about how an event will affect a host
nation’s political economy. The “authoritative studies” commissioned and disseminated by those
who stand to gain from an event have proved harmful in that they systematically raise
expectations beyond that which is reasonable. Unmet expectations can undermine the political
and social fabric and cause long-term harm to a host nation. As it currently stands, the entire
structure of the sports mega-event market shouts “potential host beware.” That needs to be
changed to ensure that hosting provides benefits at least equal to costs, and that the benefits are
shared in a way to include ordinary citizens who fund the event through their tax dollars or a
reduction in social services. Gold in the current arrangement is more scarce for hosts than it is
for the athletes who actually compete.

1

There are according to the latest reports 1.13 million unemployed people in Brazil out of a workforce of 23.29
million. See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/unemployment-rate. Accessed January 17, 2014. Creating
120,000 new jobs would reduce the unemployed persons number by 10.62 percent.
2
Federal revenue sharing in the United States, for example, was significantly reduced in 1987, and that created a
financial crisis in many cities across the United States. See http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/31/us/end-of-federalrevenue-sharing-creating-financial-crises-in-many-cities.html?src=pm&pagewanted=2. Accessed on February 22,
2014.
3
TV rights generated a mere 4% of the revenues generated by the Games, but the die had been cast. It is also
noteworthy that the 1956 Games were boycotted by newsreel and television networks across the world over the issue
of free coverage. See Barney et al., Selling the Five Rings, for detailed information on these important
developments.
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